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Abstract: Of primary importance in formulating a response to the increasing prevalence and 
power of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in society are questions of ontology. Questions 
such as: What “are” these systems?  How are they to be regarded?  How does an algorithm 
come to be regarded as an agent?  We discuss three factors which hinder discussion and obscure 
attempts to form a clear ontology of AI: (1) the various and evolving definitions of AI, (2) the 
tendency for pre-existing technologies to be assimilated and regarded as “normal,” and (3) the 
tendency of human beings to anthropomorphize.  This list is not intended as exhaustive, nor is it 
seen to preclude entirely a clear ontology, however, these challenges are a necessary set of 
topics for consideration.  Each of these factors is seen to present a 'moving target' for discussion, 
which poses a challenge for both technical specialists and non-practitioners of AI systems 
development (e.g., philosophers and theologians) to speak meaningfully given that the corpus of 
AI structures and capabilities evolves at a rapid pace.  Finally, we present avenues for moving 
forward, including opportunities for collaborative synthesis for scholars in philosophy and 
science. 
Introduction 
Society is undergoing profound transformation due to the increasing effectiveness and reach of 
artificial intelligence (AI) applications. Predictions and warnings abound that the ascendancy of 
AI poses an “existential threat” to humanity,1,2,3 and not simply in the form of “killer robots” or 
sentient AIs rendering humans obsolete. On the contrary, a number of more “mundane” threats 
and opportunities exist, as AI applications are revolutionizing widely-held conceptions of 
personhood and work. Although much prior work exists from antiquity through 2010, recent 
advances in machine learning (ML) often exceed prior conceptions of AIs’ capabilities. 
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Significant work on “Theology and AI”4,5,6 predates the sweeping changes afforded by the 
successes of ML systems and the scale on which they are deployed. Many key theologians and 
ethicists were responding to “classic AI.”  While time-honored reflections on concepts of 
automation, personhood and agency still apply, what's new is that the scope and reach of AI 
applications in society, their effectiveness, their ability to learn and synthesize, and the kinds of 
tasks they perform all vastly exceed what was widely thought possible or even conceivable even 
ten years ago. As a result, our conceptions of AI have continued to evolve, and there is renewed 
interest in establishing a clear understanding of these systems and their implications for society.  
Fundamental questions continue to be asked, such as: What is AI?  How are such systems to be 
regarded?  Is it appropriate to ascribe agency to algorithms?   
 
Derek Schuurman argues for the primacy of ontology7 as a precedent to addressing issues of 
application: “Once we have established the ontological question of who we are and what 
machines are, we can start asking the questions about the best way to move forward, including 
questions about the appropriate use of AI.”8  Regarding something on the basis of what it is is 
consistent with a traditional philosophical orientation that says things act in accordance to what 
they are, i.e., their ontology.  There is a sense of immediacy to this approach in our modern 
technological society, for as George Grant remarked, “technology is the ontology of the age,”9 
and the particular technology increasingly touted for its potentially transformational character is 
AI.  Andrew Ng expresses this in the claim that “AI is the new electricity,”10 in other words, that 
AI is poised to empower and revolutionize all areas of society. 
 
Some may regard the matter of ontology to be irrelevant, that one needs only to adopt an 
instrumentalist viewpoint of studying the interactions between humans, machines and other 
actants in the form of an Actor-Network Theory,11 or that the fundamental understanding of AI 
will result exclusively from rigorous development in the wider context of Human Computer 
Interaction (HCI).  While these views have merit — indeed we may arrive at the need for 
treatment in terms of HCI — there may be significant value in investigating what AI is per se.  
Such an account will face a few challenges which we will describe.  A starting point for these 
challenges can be seen in the following biographical observations. 
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Prelude: The Joy of the Creator 
I confess that early in my studies in ML, I found myself blurring the lines regarding the ontology 
of the ML applications I would come across.  Although I tended to be one who would be quick to 
point out the errors of others who anthropomorphize “intelligent” systems of various kinds, I 
found myself doting on, even cheering on the very “bots” that I had written from scratch, as I 
watched them grow in ability to perform some task. 
 
I am a latecomer to the field of ML, although multidimensional nonlinear optimization problems 
were part of my training and my Ph.D. as a computational astrophysicist. The underlying 
techniques for the centuries-old problem of “curve-fitting” in the physical sciences amounts to a 
large class of ML problems. In fact, the problem of fitting a line to a set of data points is so 
fundamental that many ML curricula and tutorials use it as a foundational example for neural 
networks and/or evolutionary algorithms.12,13,14,15 
 
Yet I never got as excited about watching my equation-solving numerical methods converge to a 
solution as I have watching simple ML toys “learn.” The first example that hooked me as an 
“ML enthusiast” was a tutorial by Andrew Trask in which a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) 
“learns” to do binary addition.16  Seeing this “bot” start from nothing, making mistake after 
mistake but gradually improving, until finally achieving mastery, lit a fire of eagerness and 
curiosity and in me which continues.  It is not obvious to me why this is the case: I had written 
numerous iterative-refinement solvers over the years (e.g., using Newton’s method), and yet for 
these I never made the cognitive jump to regard these systems as “learning;” I never 
anthropomorphized them.  
 
Objectively, this RNN system is merely translating a series of binary inputs to a series of binary 
outputs by successively approximating some multidimensional mapping function, but it kindled 
in me a joy, a sense of having created something (even though the code was Trask’s!), and that 
something was a tiny agent.  
 
Where did this joy and attribution of agency come from?  Was it born of ignorance about 
“what’s really going on under the hood”?  Only partly, for I also painstakingly recreated the 
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code’s matrix operations using a large Excel spreadsheet.  As I did so, my enthusiasm 
diminished somewhat, but mostly because the process was indeed painstaking.  Sharing the 
original code with students two years later, I still experienced excitement and a sense of wonder 
similar to my first encounter.  
 
There seems to be a qualitative difference between regarding something as a mathematical 
operation and attributing intelligent agency to it.  Part of this has to do with the ways we 
typically define intelligence.  
Challenge 1: Changing Definitions of AI 
The term “artificial intelligence” has a long and varied history and tends to mean different things 
to different people.  For some, it means nothing short of being able to perform any cognitive task 
that a human being can.  For others, demonstration of very limited and task-oriented competence 
may suffice.  Still, for others, AI is a marketing term chosen in recent years either intentionally 
or reluctantly, by those researchers who admit that “statistics” garners the least amount of 
enthusiasm or “buzz” from the general population, with “machine learning” generating greater 
buzz, leading up to “artificial intelligence” which may invite media frenzy.  The various re-
brandings of AI concepts with different terminology throughout its history may further obscure 
what sort of AI one is talking about. As UC Berkeley professor Michael Jordan notes, “The 
current public dialogue about these issues too often uses ‘AI’ as an intellectual wildcard, one that 
makes it difficult to reason about the scope and consequences of emerging technology”17 
(emphasis mine).  
 
Although the concept of “machines that can think” has existed for many years, and initially was 
investigated in depth by Alan Turing, the term “artificial intelligence” was coined by John 
McCarthy, who organized the first artificial intelligence conference at Dartmouth College in 
1956 for the purpose of organizing an effort to create human-like intelligence in a machine. 
McCarthy used this terminology to distinguish this line of research from the preexisting field of 
Norbert Wiener known as “cybernetics,” which was defined in terms of control and 
communication of animal and machine systems.  The field of ML arose primarily in a 
cybernetics context, rather than in trying to simulate human thought, but given that the 
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application goals of many ML systems involve performing human-like tasks, the connection with 
AI is a close one. ML is now commonly regarded as a subset of AI, and so we will follow similar 
usage.  
 
Writing a succinct definition of AI is a process with so many non-unique outcomes that there 
exist catalogues of various definitions,18 even classified according to the principles underlying 
each definition.19,20  
 
The source of variation in defining “artificial intelligence” lies more in the “intelligence” part 
than the “artificial” part.21  Some experts take a minimal definition, defining intelligence as 
“doing the right thing at the right time,”22 or any adaptive system (including evolution by natural 
selection23).  Others cast it in terms of either thinking or action, with the goal of either mimicking 
humans or meeting some rational standard.24    Components of intelligence may or may not 
include awareness, perception, reasoning, planning, and/or goal-setting.  Consciousness, another 
concept with no clear consensus of meaning, is missing from many definitions of intelligence, 
and thus may be regarded as non-essential. 
 
These variations are reflected in the choices of terminology which AI researchers have employed 
over the years to describe their work, often developing specialized nomenclature to distinguish 
their approaches from others.  A few such specific terms are worth covering, as they will inform 
later discussion. 
 
The terms “classic AI” and “Good Old Fashioned AI” (GOFAI)25 refer to systems which employ 
human-programmed expertise and symbolic representations to behave in certain ways, using so-
called “handcrafted knowledge.”26  This approach is exemplified in “expert systems” which 
often operate on the basis of hard-coded decision trees.  Intuit’s TurboTax program is a well-
known example of this: by asking the user a series of questions, the algorithm is able to do the 
work of a tax accountant.27 One important class of GOFAI consists of game agents such as the 
IBM chess system DeepBlue28 which famously defeated Grandmaster Gary Kasparov in 1995.29  
Another relevant GOFAI example is  Joseph Weizenbaum’s computerized “therapist” ELIZA,30 
which used a series of pre-programmed patterns to mimic human dialogue.   
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In contrast to GOFAI, ML systems generally operate in numerical rather than symbolic ways, 
performing statistical inference from large datasets using an iterative optimization procedure that 
produces effects akin to human learning.  Whereas GOFAI suffered from “brittleness” or 
catastrophic failure for small deviations outside the prescribed domains of their rules, the 
numerical nature of ML systems tends to allow for more “graceful degradation — in which 
imperfections in the data lead to proportionally imperfect but often acceptable performance.”31   
To emphasize the statistical nature, some researchers prefer to use the term “statistical learning” 
for such systems.32,33 The ML successor to DeepBlue was Giraffe34 and later AlphaZero,35 both 
of which achieved chess mastery purely by learning from self-play.  The latter not only defeated 
human experts but demolished the highest-rated expert-system chess program.36  
 
This ability for ML approaches to outperform classic AI systems has been seen dramatically in 
the results of trained neural network models which exceeded the performance of human-
programmed algorithms in domains such as image and speech recognition,37 and currently 
comprise the “best in class” solutions for many tasks.38 This success has become so remarkable 
that the use of machines for tasks such as image recognition or speech synthesis are increasingly 
referred to by the tasks themselves, e.g., “facial recognition” rather than “AI.”  We will discuss 
this de-assignment of the moniker “AI” further as part of Challenge 2: The New Normal, below.  
 
The task-specific nature of applications of classic AI and ML to date have also caused 
disagreement over whether these constitute true AI.39  Some choose to use the term “weak AI” or 
“narrow AI” for such applications, to distinguish them from “strong AI”40,41 or “artificial general 
intelligence” (AGI) which involves mimicry of human-like performance across all cognitive 
domains.  A vast amount of speculative fiction has been written about AGI, but so far, the 
speculation has vastly outstripped reality; we still have yet to see any computer code 
implementing a significant part of an AGI system.  Even recent sensational claims to the 
contrary42 seem upon closer inspection to fall short of the AGI ideal.  One reason for this 
imbalance of fiction to reality will be discussed later in Challenge 3: Anthropomorphism.  
 
As we described in the Prelude, ML algorithms have much in common with iterative 
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approximation techniques which have been known since the days of Isaac Newton. Given the 
close association between ML and AI, often expressed mathematically as ML ⊂ AI, this means 
that longstanding data analysis techniques used throughout the sciences are becoming re-branded 
as ML and hence AI, often in order to take advantage of the current cycle of “AI Hype.”43,44  
Algorithms such as fitting a curve to a set of data points were previously not regarded (by many) 
as constituting AI, and yet their implementation as the core methods of AI applications has 
brought such techniques to the forefront of discussions on AI — indeed, it has often been 
remarked that the “new wave” of highly successful ML systems applied essentially similar 
statistical techniques to those from years past, but with the benefit of vastly greater stores of 
training data (made possible by the internet).45  Thus the underlying ontology of what the 
algorithm is may not be as important for determining the appropriateness of the label “AI” as the 
intended use of the system.  Because of the ambiguities associated with the term AI, some 
researchers prefer to avoid its use and constrain their discussions to the specific ML algorithms 
involved —- Random Forests, Hidden Markov Models, Non-negative Matrix Factorization, 
Independent Component Analysis, Naïve Bayes, Gaussian Processes, (Artificial) Neural 
Networks, Deep Learning, etc. This specificity is useful from a technical perspective, but 
ontologically these algorithms are qualitatively of the same kind.  What is ontologically relevant 
for all these is that since a deployed ML system is a function of (and thereby not easily separable 
from) its training dataset and even the particular starting point for the training procedure,46 this 
means that an ML-based AI “is” not merely the algorithm and its intended use, but also the 
dataset used to train it. 
 
In addition to the various uses and terminology just described, the AI definition which seems to 
be most applicable in regard to the implications of AI on the development of society is one 
which exists on the level of near folklore:  
 
“AI is a computer doing what we used to think only a human could do.”47  
 
This “folklore” definition seems to capture the way that researchers and the public regard both 
new AI technology (i.e., when a task or problem is being attempted or when a new paradigm is 
introduced) and old AI technology (i.e., after some time has passed since a problem is largely 
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regarded as “solved”).  We will explore this in greater detail in the next section; it is the “used 
to” part of the “folklore definition” that leads us to Challenge 2 for an ontology of AI. 
 
The central point of this section is not the mere observation that there exist a variety of possible 
definitions for AI.  While the fact that AI is not a monolithic, universal concept does pose some 
difficulty, the principal challenge arises from the fact that the scope of what is considered to 
“count” as AI is continually undergoing revision.  One might assume that this scope is 
monotonically increasing, however in the next section we note a mechanism by which this scope 
can also shrink, and thus the overall landscape of “what is [regarded as] AI” is in a state of flux.  
Challenge 2: The New Normal 
The “folklore” definition of AI resonates with remarks by Douglas Adams on the 
“normalization” (sometimes referred to as “reification”) of technologies: 
 
I’ve come up with a set of rules that describe our reactions to technologies: 
1.  Anything that is in the world when you’re born is normal and ordinary and is just 
a natural part of the way the world works. 
2. Anything that’s invented between when you’re fifteen and thirty-five is new and 
exciting and revolutionary and you can probably get a career in it. 
3. Anything invented after you’re thirty-five is against the natural order of 
things...and the beginning of the end of civilisation as we know it until it’s been 
around for about ten years when it gradually turns out to be alright really.48  
 
Now that speech recognition systems are successfully employed in smartphones and smart 
speakers with high degrees of accuracy, many members of the public may not regard speech-to-
text conversion (itself) as “AI,” even though previously such systems were considered by many 
to constitute AI.  Even if such applications arose via training of sophisticated ML systems which 
themselves may count as AI to the researchers developing them, the normalization, ubiquity and 
reification of applications like Siri and Alexa have allowed members of the public to regard 
speech-to-text conversion as simply a tool or a task, without ascribing any intelligence to the 
system performing it.  One may inquire: Now that systems are able to learn from “experience,” 
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do people still regard Expert Systems as AI?  Or do they say, “That’s just…” (e.g., a set of 
nested if-then statements).  When one hears the phrase, “That’s not really AI, that’s just…” — an 
ontological assertion — it may indicate the speaker reserves “AI” for AGI, or it may indicate a 
change in attitude, i.e. a re-estimation of the worthiness of the “AI” label in favor of a more 
specific, mechanistic label which focuses on the task being completed, without regard for any 
intelligence used to complete the task. 
 
This means that the term AI, even within the limited context of ML, is a “moving target.”  The 
challenge this implies for developing an ontology of AI is that the usage of the term may be 
inseparable from whatever the current state of technology is when the term is being applied.  
 
The first two challenges for a clear ontology of AI may be seen to involve the demarcation of AI 
in both conceptual and linguistic terms. One may rightfully raise the question of which 
community’s conceptions and language are most relevant: the algorithm developers, the 
technologists who apply and deploy them, the journalists who break news about these 
developments, the general public who must come to terms with them, the philosophers who wish 
to make sense of them, or notably the theologians who wish to respond to them in the context of 
Biblical teaching?  Surely, one may argue, the general public and journalists often misquote or 
misapply the ideas of more rigorous thinkers on a variety of topics, and AI should be no 
exception. But the preceding observations are not limited in scope to any one particular 
subculture, and there is often an interplay of influence between these various groups, and the 
larger topic of “AI, Ethics and Society” merits discussion among all of them.  Even the most 
careful thinkers, it is argued, may have no way to avoid basic human tendencies that obscure 
attempts at clearly demarcating AI from other related concepts.  One such unavoidable tendency 
is that of anthropomorphism. 
Challenge 3: Anthropomorphism  
The tendency to ascribe human faculties and/or intentions to entities in the world (animals, 
machines, objects, “forces of nature”) has existed since antiquity.  Francis Bacon observed that it 
often impedes our understanding of the natural world, as what he called “The Idol of the Tribe”: 
“For it is a false assertion that the sense of man is the measure of things.”49 Put differently, 
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anthropomorphism amounts to a “cognitive bias”50 and as such impedes one’s ability to regard 
things as they are — i.e., ontologically.  Despite its association with unenlightened eras, 
anthropomorphism occurs even today – perhaps even more so than previously. As Waytz et al. 
observed, “Although [anthropomorphism is] commonly considered to be a relatively universal 
phenomenon with only limited importance in modern industrialized societies—more cute than 
critical—our research suggests precisely the opposite.”51  
 
Anthropomorphism appears as the “go-to” model or metaphor by which humans initially seek to 
understand new phenomena — the “hammer” we try to apply to many “nails,” if you will.  Beth 
Singler of the Faraday Institute has said anthropomorphism arises “because we are social beings 
who need to place the things around ourselves into a social scheme that makes sense of them.”52 
It is widely speculated that our cognition is biologically optimized to process our “local world” 
which is predominantly a social one. A common sentiment is that it is “hypothesized to have 
evolved because it favored cooperation among early humans.”53 So strong is the tendency to 
project human-like qualities onto other things, that it is regarded as unavoidable.  As 
mechatronics researcher Dr. Fumiya Iida has described, “Anthropomorphization is [an] incurable 
disease for human[s].”54  Anthropomorphism appears to be more likely to arise in situations for 
which detailed operational knowledge is not available, or when novel unexpected emergent 
behavior arises, such as in the case of certain moves by AlphaGo.55,56,57  
 
Anthropomorphism plays a key role in the design of AI systems, and even in the conception of 
AI.  The earliest formulations of the concept of AI are anthropomorphic.  The “Turing Test”51 is 
built around the model of human intelligence: can a machine communicate in such a way as to 
fool a human into regarding it (the machine) as human? McCarthy’s goal of the Dartmouth 
conference58 was explicitly human-centric.  Beyond that, anthropomorphism is found to serve a 
utilitarian purpose in design, which “can be used today to facilitate social interactions between 
humans and a new type of cooperative and interactive agents – social robots.”59  This means that 
it can allow for more intuitive use of such robots, particularly in “caregiving” applications such 
as intervening in the development autistic children,60,61 and some care of the elderly.62,63  It has 
also been warned that the anthropomorphic urge could be hijacked to create inappropriate 
bonding with artifacts, and thus ethical design should provide transparency to avoid such 
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misuse.64  Concerns about the inappropriate use of anthropomorphic aspects of AI led 
Weizenbaum, creator of the ELIZA “psychotherapist,” to later oppose the use of such systems in 
“interpersonal” settings: 
“I would put all projects that propose to substitute a computer system for a human 
function that involves interpersonal respect, understanding, and love in the same 
category. I therefore reject [Kenneth] Colby's proposal that computers be installed as 
psychotherapists, not on the grounds that such a project might be technically infeasible, 
but on the grounds that it is immoral.”65(emphasis mine) 
 
The effects of the cognitive bias of anthropomorphism are manifold.  Robert Wortham observes 
that it can result in “moral confusion about the status of robots in particular, and artificial 
intelligence more generally.”66 This confusion can involve questions of whether robots should 
have rights,67 whether AI systems should be granted status as legal persons,68 and in general 
whether humans have a responsibility toward robots, so-called “moral patiency.”69 Moral 
patiency of machines is regarded as such a serious danger that Joanna Bryson states forcefully, 
“We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to.”70 It is anthropomorphism which is 
identified as a key obscuring factor contributing to misperceptions of moral agency and/or 
patiency, as Wortham continues: “There are serious concerns that our anthropomorphism and 
misunderstanding of the nature of robots extends so far as to attribute them either moral patiency, 
moral agency, or both.”71,72,73  A further common effect is that of “overidentification,”74 in which 
humans may ascribe additional human attributes to machines, based on performance at tasks of 
logic and language. That is to say, having observed a system performing tasks of logic and 
language, there is a common human tendency to ascribe or project a host of additional cognitive 
and behavioral faculties onto the machine. This extrapolation by the user may be unwarranted, 
such as in the example of a “self-driving” car which can stay in its lane well and thus come to be 
regarded as an excellent driver, but can be thwarted by the appearance of a bicyclist75 or a lane 
division76 and lead to death; overidentification is a likely contributor to driver inattention in such 
cases.   Finally, anthropomorphism has the effect of making it all too easy to write (yet more) 
fiction about AGI.  This can distract conversations from real, immediate dangers and 
opportunities, to speculations on severely underdetermined scenarios set in the far future. As 
Andrew Ng recently lamented, “AI+ethics is important, but has been partly hijacked by the AGI 
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(artificial general intelligence) hype. Let's cut out the AGI nonsense and spend more time on the 
urgent problems: Job loss/stagnant wages, undermining democracy, discrimination/bias, wealth 
inequality.”77  
 
Existing in a “dual” relationship to anthropomorphism is the tendency to dehumanize (or 
objectify), an ontological error whereby the personhood, individuality and value of human 
beings are denied and replaced with a regard for humans only as things.  In committing this 
error, we move from the “I-Thou” mode of relation identified by Martin Buber,78 to one of “I-It.” 
In an AI context, dehumanization arises in a variety of ways.  Firstly, it may be explicitly stated, 
in a naturalistic approach to the so-called “mind-body problem,” that humans are merely 
machines and that the mind is not simply like a computer, it is a computer.79 In contrast, in the 
words of Schuurman, “A Christian perspective accounts for reality as extending beyond the 
physical world to include a spiritual realm. This ontological starting point will reject the 
reductionistic notion that humans are simply complex biochemical machines, while still 
affirming the value of the physical world.”80  Secondly, dehumanization can arise as a result of 
the anthropomorphism of artificially intelligent systems.  Bryson states it thusly: “In humanising 
[robots], we...further dehumanise real people.”81  The other primary avenue for dehumanization 
arises from its utility in modeling human behavior, for applications such as recommendation 
systems and targeted marketing, and for manipulating human behavior. This was evidenced in 
the news of Facebook’s deliberate attempts to make their application more addictive, referring to 
people as “eyeballs.”82  The ontological error of viewing humans as machines can have a series 
of ethical consequences, such as in the area of employment: The extent to which we view 
humans mechanistically suggests the extent to which we will automate people out of jobs.  
Christians have historically opposed the tendency to dehumanize and objectify, on the basis of 
love of one’s neighbor and the doctrine of imago dei.  This is an area in which Christians can 
continue to have a significant witness to the larger society, as the temptations to dehumanize are 
likely to increase along with the scale of deployment and success of AI systems at performing 
various tasks.  This also presents opportunities for partnership with secular individuals and 
institutions dedicated to the ethical use of AI, as Christian positions are often in agreement with 
secular ones, such as in opposing the dehumanizing implications of sex robots,83 or of AI-
empowered surveillance technology and the utility of classification systems for enabling 
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oppressive government practices.84  
Avenues for Moving Forward  
While a rigorous ontology of AI may be difficult, it has not been shown to be impossible.  On the 
other hand, it may not be necessary, as alternative approaches are available.  Given that questions 
regarding AI are invariably bound up with questions of humanity, it may be that AI is not a 
distinct concept that can be well-demarcated from humanity, and thus a broader context of 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) may be a more fruitful avenue.  Alternatively, an 
“instrumentalist” approach such as Actor-Network Theory,85 that would focus only on what AI 
does in its interactions with other parts of a larger system, may provide a more efficient route to 
answering questions of application and appropriate use.  Finally, a “process philosophy” which 
regards things not as they are but how they undergo change — which amounts to an ontological 
position albeit with a different emphasis from the traditional one — may prove profitable.   
 
It is not the intent of this paper to evaluate the relative merits of these approaches in comparison 
to an ontological approach, however one key question in such an evaluation would be: Does an 
ontology of AI “get you anything” that these other approaches do not?  An answer to this may lie 
in current discussions of explainability and transparency. A “black box” system which is known 
only via its exterior interactions is unlikely to garner public trust86 and likely fails to meet the 
“right to explanation” requirement laid out in the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR).87  There are methods for probing the internal logic of black boxes with the 
goal of explainability,88 however these are not applicable in all situations.  In general, the issue 
of transparency is not a simple one, for naïvely manifesting the totality of what an algorithm is 
— by exposing its source code and, for example, the internal weights of a neural network, and 
also its (potentially biased) training dataset89 — does not constitute an explanation, and designers 
of systems with transparency in mind must consider the level of detail shared so as not to 
overwhelm the user, and to provide transparency with the goal of understanding in mind.90  Such 
a level of detail would need to be chosen according to the intended users, and amounts to a kind 
of user interface design.  In this case, transparency may be regarded as being more consistent 
with instrumentalism than ontology, because the emphasis is on clarifying what the system is 
doing rather than what it is.  However, the function of transparency is to foster “the ability of a 
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naive observer to form an accurate model of a robot’s capabilities, intentions and purpose,”91 for 
goals which include clearly demarcating the ontological difference between a machine 
intelligence and human, and in so doing, to mitigate the effects of anthropomorphism discussed 
earlier.   
 
Another notable avenue, which is both a form of ontology and an alternative orientation, is the 
functionalist approach to AI-ethics employed by Joanna Bryson.92,93 In this case there is an 
ontology that posits the inequality of the human and the machine, however with the goal of 
preservation of the social order rather than the affirmation of any metaphysical significance to 
the individual (i.e., without an imago dei).  It is notable that, once again, although the 
functionalist approach rests on a different foundation than Christian ethics, many of the 
implications of the former for “AI, Ethics and Society” are sufficiently in alignment with 
traditional Christian moral and ethical positions that significant opportunities for partnership 
exist between Christians and those operating from such “secular” standpoints.  
  
Finally, we note that the pace of advancements in AI, particularly in the area of ML, has become 
so rapid that dramatic announcements arise with a frequency of every few months, with six 
months being a common timescale for significant achievements. It is typical for successful 
methods to be superseded within a year or two, and the understanding of their implications to 
require some revision. Thus the peer-review process in the ML field occurs more in the form of 
conferences than in journals (whose longer review time can impede dissemination). In such a 
swiftly changing landscape, it is possible for those without immediate connection to the technical 
field to make statements which no longer apply, for example “AI doesn’t do X, it merely does 
Y,” only to be corrected that indeed “AI now does X, as of six months ago.” So for Christian 
philosophers and theologians, it is recommended that they form partnerships with those in the 
technical sectors of academia and/or industry in order to stay current — and therefore relevant.  
This assumes that there will exist participants in the technical domains who are interested in 
partnering for the purpose of Christian scholarship, and thus we see, as with other areas of 
science, the need for Christians to enter such fields and perform excellent work with diligence 
and integrity. 
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Conclusions 
In response to interest in establishing an ontology of AI, we have not achieved this goal, but have 
raised awareness of three challenges which can hinder dialogue and obscure clear thinking about 
what AI is.  These challenges are significant and make the establishment of a clear ontology of 
AI more difficult.  The first challenge is the various and changing ways in which AI is defined in 
terms of the research community and society at large, and the evolving scope of what sorts of 
algorithms “count” as AI.  The second challenge is a result of the widespread successful 
deployment of some AI systems, when they reach the point where the previously-challenging 
tasks they perform come to be reified and regarded as simply “normal,” such that the frontier of 
what is regarded as AI by the general populace advances toward more difficult problems.  These 
first two challenges are more than mere semantic objections: in the words of theologian Michael 
Burdett, “the language we use is important because it manifests our ontological commitments.”94 
Conversely, as Mary Midgely has argued, our language not only exposes but tends to shape our 
ontological commitments.95  The final challenge is that of the unavoidable human tendency to 
anthropomorphize, which yields a cognitive bias that can manifest in ways such as projecting 
moral agency and/or patiency toward machine intelligences. The advancing performance of AI at 
tasks of language and logic means that the overidentification of human attributes with AI is 
likely to evolve as well.  This is a challenge but also the reason why developing a clearer 
ontology for AI is an important undertaking.  In order for scholars in theology and philosophy to 
keep pace with the rapid changes in the technical performance, conceptions and scope of AI 
systems, it is recommended that collaborative partnerships be formed with active technical 
practitioners of AI systems development.   
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